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Dreamily he puzzled it out. You plan to go out for a drink, but you’re worried there won’t be enough to talk about, resulting in that dreaded awkward silence. Garrett 1997: 92, 94) Similarly, David Owen holds that Hume’s Problem of induction is not an argument against the reasonableness of inductive inference, but, "Rather Hume is arguing that reason cannot explain how we come to have beliefs in the unobserved on the basis of past experience." (Owen 1999: 6) We see that there are a variety of interpretations of Hume’s Problem of induction and, as we will see below, how we interpret the Problem will inform how we interpret his ultimate causal position. However, this practice may not be as uncharitable as it appears, as many scholars see the first definition as the only component of his account relevant to metaphysics. This focus on D1 is regarded as deeply problematic by some Hume scholars (Francis Dauer, H.O.

Therefore, whether or not the projectivism of D2 actually is relevant to the metaphysics of causation, a strong case can be made that Hume thinks it is so, and therefore an accurate historical interpretation needs to include D2 in order to capture Hume’s intentions. However, since this interpretation, as Hume’s own historical position, remains in contention, the appellation will be avoided here. The supporters of Humean causal skepticism can then be seen as ascribing to him what seems to be a reasonable position, which is, the conclusion that we have no knowledge of such causal claims, as they would necessarily lack proper justification. Here, Hume seems to have causal inference supported by instinct rather than reason. It is more comfortable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding. The more common Humean reduction, then, adds a projectivist twist by somehow reducing causation to constant conjunction plus the internal impression of necessity.

Nevertheless, reductionism is not the only way to interpret Hume’s theory of causation. Even considering Hume’s alternate account of definitions, where a definition is an enumeration of the constituent ideas of the definiendum, this does not change the two definitions’ reductive nature. Given that Hume’s discussions of causation culminate in these two definitions, combined with the fact that the conception of causation they provide is used in Hume’s later philosophical arguments of the Treatise, the definitions play a crucial role in understanding his account of causation. First, there are reductionists that insist Hume reduces causation to nothing beyond constant conjunction, that is, the reduction is to a simple naïve regularity theory of causation, and therefore the mental projection of D2 plays no part. T 1.3.2.11; SBN 77) In short, a reduction to D1 ignores the mental determination component. In other words, rather than interpreting Hume’s insights about the tenuousness of our idea of causation as representing an ontological reduction of what causation is, Humean causal skepticism can instead be viewed as his clearly demarcating the limits of our knowledge in this area and then tracing out the ramifications of this limiting.

In addition to its accounting for the necessity of causation mentioned above, recall that Hume makes frequent reference to both definitions as accurate or just, and at one point even refers to D2 as constituting the essence of causation. By putting the two definitions at center state, Hume can plausibly be read as emphasizing that our only notion of causation is constant conjunction with certitude that it will continue. If, as is often the case, we take definitions to represent the necessary and sufficient conditions of the definiendum, then both the definitions are reductive notions of causation. Having described these two important components of his account of causation, let us consider how Hume’s position on causation is variously interpreted, what is billiards starting with causal reductionism. However, not everyone agrees that D2 can or should be dropped so easily from Hume’s system. There are, however, some difficulties with this interpretation. From the courtyard, however, the party took the path to the left, leading between two walls through another courtyard to the annexe. It is a foul to touch, move or change the path of any object ball except by the normal ball-toball contacts during shots.